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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
7 This is an action by Plaintiff to compel the Defen-
dant to pay for some 1,600 tons of top soil which Defen-
dant had previously removed from land owned by the 
Plaintiff, and for which no payment had been made. De-
6 f endant counterclaimed alleging the existence of a lease 
2 agreement and prayed for an award of damages resulting 
from Plaintiff's repudiation of said lease. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial on the merits before the Honorable Stew-
art M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District for 
the County of Salt Lake, sitting without a jury, the Court 
held that the testimony presented, together with the prac-
tice over the years indicated that Defendant was under 
no obligation to pay for said top soil until such time as it 
had actually been sold by him. 
The Court further held that the statute of limita-
tions would bar any claim which the Plaintiff might have 
at such time as the soil might be sold. 
The Trial Court held that the terms and conditions 
of the purported lease agreement were so vague and un-
certain that the Court could not interpret them. The 
Court held that Defendant's prayer for damages could not 1 
be granted because the damages were so speculative. The 
Court held that even if it could find for the Defendant, 
it would be unable to determine damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
As Respondent, Plainitff seeks affirmance of the judg- , 
ment of the Trial Court denying Defendant, Appellant's 
Counterclaim and prayer for damages. 
As Cross-Appellant, Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the Trial Court denying Plaintiff's claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Plaintiff generally agrees with the chrono-
logical development of the facts as stated by Defendants, , 
certain pertinent facts have been misstated, certain per-
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tinent facts have been omitted entirely and certain erron-
eous conclusions have been drawn from the facts as stated. 
Defendant's statement of the facts is not reflective of the 
true posture of the case. It is mainly an argument of De-
fendant's point of view and not of assistance in determin-
ing whether the judgment below is supported by the evi-
dence. 
Plaintiff has for a period of many years owned cer-
tain patented lode mining claims in Little Cottonwood 
Canyon of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R-1, 7, 9). 
In 1953 the Alta Wasatch Development Company was 
formed by several officers and directors of the Plaintiff 
company. (Defendant's Deposition pages 10, 11, 12, 69). 
The purpose of the new company was to develop mineral 
interests on the Flagstaff claim, one of the claims owned 
by Plaintiff company. (R-109, Defendant's Deposition 
pages 11, 12, 69). 
The Defendant, who was an officer and director of 
the Alta Wasatch Development Company, (Defendant's 
Deposition pages 7, 8, 10, 66) , and also an officer of the 
Plaintiff company, (Defendant's Deposition pages 14, 64), 
felt there was some economic value to the top soil on 
Plaintiff's land. He made a proposal to the other officers 
and directors that he be given the opportunity to remove 
some of this soil for purposes of resale. Defendant claims 
to have entered into a written agreement with one corpor-
ation or the other, granting him this opportunity. (R-117, 
118, Defendant's Deposition pages 15, 16, 18). Neither 
Plaintiff nor Defendant have been able to produce even 
' 1 a copy of this agreement. It would appear that it is either 
lost, (R-117, 114, Defendant's Deposition pages 19, 23), 
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or that it was "scrapped" in 1956. (Defendant's Deposi-
tion page 23). Consequently, the parties and terms of this 
alleged original agreement are not known. 
Defendant introduced into evidence three documents 
which he claims are amendments to the alleged original 
lease agreement, in an attempt to establish the terms and ' 
conditions of the alleged agreement. (Exhibits D-3, D-4 
and D-7). 
During the time the Defendant and Plaintiff have 
been associated, a considerable amount of top soil has been 
removed by the Defendant. In approximately 1952, De-
fendant removed one truckload of soil for experimental 
purposes (Defendant's Deposition pages 35, 36), and 
again in November of 1955, fifty tons were removed for 
additional tests (Defendant's Deposition page 36). Dur- , 
ing the Fall of 1963, an additional 260 tons were removeJ. 
All of this soil has been paid for by the Defendant, (De-
fendant's Deposition pages 36, 42), and consequently, is 
not included in Plaintiff's claim against Defendant. 
During the Fall of 1958, Defendant removed an addi-
tional 1,600 tons of soil from the property of the Plaintiff. 
This soil was stockpiled in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the 
home of the Defendant's sister and neighbor, pending 
shipments during the Winter to purchasers in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. (Defendant's Deposition pages 16, 17, 38, 39, 
52). Of the 1,600 tons of soil in the stockpile, approxi-
mately 300 tons have actually been shipped to Las Vegas. 
Defendant argues that in September of 1958, at a 
meeting of the directors of Plaintiff company, at which 
time he was granted permission to stockpile the soil, it 
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was further orally agreed that he need not pay for said 
soil until it had actually been sold. ( R-83, 86, 87, 97). 
Plaintiff contends that no such agreement was ever made 
on behalf of Wasatch Mines Company and that, in any 
event, no one contemplated that the soil would not be 
sold within a reasonable short period ( R-52, 84, 95), or 
that Defendant would refuse altogether to sell the soil or 
pay for it after a lapse of 11 years. 
On April 16, 1963, during a board of directors meet-
ing of the Alta Wasatch Development Company, the 
agreement between the Plaintiff, Alta Wasatch Develop-
ment Company, and the Defendant was mutually declared 
terminated, without objection from Defendant. (R-164, 
Cook's Deposition pages 11, 12, 19, 20). There is evi-
dence that Defendant himself was at this meeting and 
voted to terminate the agreement. (R-146, 149, Exhibit 
E, Defendant's Deposition). Defendant disputes this evi-
dence. (Defendant's Deposition page 46). 
At a meeting of the board of directors of Plaintiff 
company held the same evening, Defendant made pro-
posals ". . . concerning his desire to obtain a contract to 
remove soils and earths from the Wasatch Mines Com-
pany property ... ". (Exhibit H, Defendant's Deposition). 
On September 23, 1963, at a meeting of the board of 
directors of Plaintiff company, further proposals were 
made by the Defendant and his attorney regarding the 
delinquent payment for the soil which had been removed, 
and regarding future soil removals. (R 138, 147, 148, 151, 
Defendant's Deposition page 46, Exhibit I, Defendant's 
Deposition). 
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On August 31, 1964, Mr. C. W. Love, corporate sec-
retary of Plaintiff company, sent a letter to the Defendant 
instructing him not to remove any additional soil until ' 
the soil already removed had been paid for, and until pro-
posals made at the previous meeting had been completed. 
(R-130, Exhibit F, Defendant's Deposition). 
Thereafter, Defendant never removed any soil from 
Plaintiff's property and the matter rested until this action 
was brought. 
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RUL-
ING THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. 
IF ENTERED INTO, WERE TOO VAGUE AND UN-
CERTAIN FOR ENFORCEMENT. 
Defendant claims to have an existing leasehold inter-
est in the real property owned by the Plaintiff. This claim 
is based upon an alleged agreement executed by certain 
parties in 1954, together with three documents presented 
by the Defendant which, Defendant claims, are amend-
ments to the original agreement. (Exhibits D-3, D-4 and 
D-7). 
Wasatch Mines Company, Respondent herein, is the 
owner and operator of mineral properties, and its princi-
pal business is the sale of minerals and mineral materials, . 
including soil. 
In 58 Corpus Juris Secundum, Mines and Minerals, 
Section 143 (b), we read: 
... in a contract for the sale of minerals or interests 
7 
therein, there must be mutual assent or meeting of 
the minds, a sufficient consideration, and the con-
tract must be clear and unambiguous, and capable 
of being performed. (Emphasis added). 
An analysis of the evidence clearly reveals that the 
terms and conditions, as set forth in Defendant's exhibits, 
are not only vague and uncertain, but ambiguous and in-
complete. 
If, as Appellant asserts, some agreement existed be-
tween Plaintiff and Defendant, what is the "agreement" 
upon which Appellant must rely? Could the "agreement" 
he asserts possibly give rise to the rights he asserts in Plain-
tiff's real property? 
Defendant alleges the existence of an early agreement 
made sometime in 1954 between Defendant and a third 
party not joined in this action, and Plaintiff. No living offi-
cer of Plaintiff can recall such an agreement. Defendant 
admits that whatever writing existed in 1954 has been lost 
or destroyed ( R-117, 144). He cannot recall certain terms 
or conditions contained in the writing, or what was re-
quired by way of compliance. He states, with respect to 
the original agreement, "I think it was scrapped when this 
was written" (Defendant's Deposition, page 23), referring 
to the 1956 instrument. How can any Court interpret and 
enforce a non-existent agreement which Defendant claims 
was "scrapped" in 1956? 
Thereafter, Defendant carried on a variety of nego-
tiations with Plaintiff's mining lessee, Alta Wasatch De-
velopment Company, and Plaintiff's directors, adjusting 
the value of the soil, determining the division of payments, 
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and other matters. That Defendant was operating under 
some form of oral or written agreement from 1954 to 1963 
is not really in dispute, but the nature and provisions of ' 
the agreement, and whether it is still in effect, are the 
basis of the controversy. 
According to the evidence presented at trial, Defen-
dant's asserted rights stem from a confused chain of oral 
and written "agreements" which resulted from various ne-
gotiations. The evidence indicates that these "agreements" 
were formally terminated by mutual consent in 1963. 
Thereafter, Defendant made proposals to the Plaintiff 
concerning a new agreement, but no new agreement was 
ever agreed upon or entered into. 
What was the nature of the pre-1963 "agreement''? , 
Defendant relies upon only three separate documents to 
establish his "rights": ( 1 ) a "Lease Amendment" dated 
February 9, 1956 which purports to amend a prior lease 
dated February 11, 1959, which is a practical impossibil-
ity; ( 2) an "Amendment to Agency Agreement" dated 
February 11, 1959, of which Plaintiff is not a party, and 
which is not a lease upon real property; and ( 3) an 
"Amendment to Lease" dated March 1, 1959, which deals 
with the division of proceeds from soil sales. None of these 
documents, taken separately or in combination, contain 
or can be construed to contain the basic elements required 
to vest rights in real property. It would appear that prior 
to 1963, Defendant had a vague understanding or agree-
ment by which he removed soil from Plaintiff's real prop-
erty. At best, the "agreement" was merely Plaintiff's con-
sent for Defendant to take the soil, a schedule of payments 
for soil removed, and a division of the proceeds among the 
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Plaintiff, Plaintiff's mining lessee and the Defendant. It 
was never intended to establish a right to the real property 
owned by the Plaintiff and did not do so. 
After the termination of the "agreements" in 1963, 
small quantities of soil were removed by the Defendant, 
but on a strictly cash sale basis, the same basis on which 
Plaintiff would sell soil to any other party. 
POINT II 
ANY LEASE, AGREEMENT, C 0 NT RAC T, 
PROFIT A' PRENDRE, ETC., THE DEFENDANT 
MAY HA VE HAD WITH THE PLAINTIFF IS NO 
LONGER IN EFFECT BY VIRTUE OF ITS TERM-
INATION IN 1963. 
On April 16, 1963 at a board of directors' meeting 
of the Alta Wasatch Development Company, the agree-
ment between Plaintiff, Alta Wasatch Development Com-
pany and the Defendant was declared at an end and term-
inated. The minutes of this meeting, (Exhibit E, Defen-
dant's Deposition), indicate that said termination was due 
to Defendant's failure to pay for soil which he had re-
moved. The minutes further indicate that Defendant was 
present and expressed no opposition, implying that he him-
self voted to terminate the agreement. This evidence was 
substantiated by the testimony of Lee Cook, a director of 
Alta Wasatch Development Company, who was in atten-
dance at the meeting, (Cook's Deposition, pages 19, 20), 
and also by the testimony of Clair M. Aldrich, Esq., a 
Director and legal advisor for the Plaintiff, who was pres-
ent, but not participating in the meeting. Mr. Aldrich tes-
tified as follows: 
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. Alta Wasatch directors voted to throw in the 
sponge, wipe the slate clean, and Mr. Hopkinson 
was present and he voted for it. I remember that 
distinctly. (R-146. See also R-148, 151). 
Later that same evening a meeting of the directors 
of Plaintiff company was held. The minute entry of this 
meeting, (Exhibit H, Defendant's Deposition), indicates 
that the purpose of the meeting was to 
... consider a proposition to be submitted by Wil-
liam Hopkinson, concerning his desire to obtain a 
contract to remove soils and earths from the Wa-
satch Mines Company property in the vicinity of 
the Wasatch Drain Tunnel. 
This evidence was also substantiated by Mr. Aldrich's tes-
timony. (R-146). 
Defendant admits on page 58 of his Deposition that 
on the morning of April 17, 1963, the day following the 
meetings, he was informed by Mr. C. W. Love, President 
of Alta Wasatch Development Company and Secretary of 
Plaintiff company, that he no longer had a "lease." 
At the September 23, 1963 board of directors' meet-
ing (Exhibit I, Defendant's Deposition) Defendant ap-
peared with his counsel and made proposals concerning 
the delinquent payments and a new agreement to remove 
soil. He promised to furnish a map of the area where he 
proposed to remove soil and to obtain a clearance from the 
Health Department and Forest Service. The minutes of 
the meeting expressly state that no action was taken on 
the proposals at that meeting. The matter of a new agree-
ment apparently died when the Defendant failed to com-
ply with his promises. 
11 
On August 31, 1964 Plaintiff's corporate secretary, 
Mr. C. W. Love, wrote Defendant informing him that he 
was to remove no soil until the amount previously re-
moved had been paid for, and until the proposals pre-
viously made had been completed. Defendant subsequently 
removed no soil and the matter rested until this action 
was brought. 
The evidence clearly shows that any agreement which 
may have been in existence between the parties was term-
inated in 1963, and further, that the Defendant was fully 
aware of its termination, and in fact complied with the 
termination. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FAIL URE TO PRESENT EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
JUSTIFIES THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT 
DAMAGES WERE TOO SPECULATIVE TO WAR-
RANT AN AWARD. 
It is elementary hornbook law that damages may not 
be awarded where not supported by proper evidence. Con-
trary to Appellant's argument, damages must be estab-
lished with some degree of exactness and certainty. "Dam-
ages must be proved with all the certainty the case per-
mits and cannot be left to conjecture, guess, or specula-
tion." 25A Corpus Juris Secundum, Damages, Section 162 
(2), page 79. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Bunnell 
vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P. 2d 597, ( 1962) that 
in order to recover damages, the complaining party must 
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prove not only that a loss has been suffered, but also must 
prove the extent and amount of that loss. Justice Callister 
said, "Damages cannot be found from mere speculative 
and conjectural evidence." (See also Bing ham Coal and 
Lumber Co., et al., vs. Board of Education of Jordan 
School District of Salt Lake County, 61 Utah 149, 211 
Pac. 981, ( 1922) ; 15 Arn. Jur., Damages, Section 356, 
pages 795-797). 
Defendant's claim for damages is based upon the pur-
ported loss of profits he suffered as a result of Plaintiff's 
repudiation of the agreement. Defendant's mere showing 
of sales made during the preceding ten years would not be 
sufficient to meet his burden. In Gould vs. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah 2d 
187, 309 P. 2d 802, 806, (1957) the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's action of setting aside a verdict 
for prospective profits because the complaining party had 
failed to show a single instance of loss of prospective busi-
ness caused by Defendant's breach. In this case, Defendant 
Hopkinson has also failed to produce evidence of a single 
customer lost as a direct result of Plaintiff's action. 
Appellant states that he did not attempt to make 
additional soil sales after 1964 because if he got a "big 
buyer" he would not be able to meet the demand for soil. 
(R-167). Prior to this time Defendant's cumulative sales 
of soil totalled only 560 tons to many individual purchasers 
during the period of 1958-1964. Since 1959 Defendant has 
has approximately 1,300 tons of soil in his stockpile. De-
fendant has never been instructed or admonished not to 
sell this soil. It would appear from the evidence that De-
fendant's loss of profits, if there are any, resulted from his 
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own lack of diligence rather than any alleged breach by 
Plaintiff. 
Appellant claims further damages for expenses in-
curred by him in reliance upon performance of the agree-
ment. However, Appellant failed to present any evidence 
indicating what these expenses were, and how they were 
in reliance upon an agreement. 
Defendant's admission that his prayer for damages 
was a mere "guesstimate" (Defendant's Deposition, page 
67), coupled with his failure to produce any evidence at 
the trial, is substantial basis for the Trial Court's ruling 
that the damages were too speculative to justify an award. 
RESPONDENT'S CONCLUSION 
The lower court, as trier of the facts, after hearing 
the testimony of the witnesses and analyzing the evidence 
prt>scnted, was unable to define the terms and conditions 
of any agreement between the parties. After having heard 
the evidence regarding its termination, the Trial Court 
refused to find a binding, enforceable agreement between 
the parties, and consequently dismissed Defendant's claim. 
Defendant's claim for damages failed because of a 
lack of evidence to substantiate the claim. 
The record contains substantial evidence to support 
the decisions of the Trial Court regarding the denial of 
Defendant's Counterclaim, and as such, it should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
PAY FOR THE SOIL REMOVED UNTIL IT HAD 
ACTUALLY BEEN SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT. 
Defendant has admitted ( 1 ) that he removed 1,600 
tons of top soil from Plaintiff's property; ( 2) that he 
agreed to pay for said top soil at the rate of $4.80 per ton; 
and ( 3) that he has never paid for said top soil despite 
demands made upon him by the Plaintiff. ( R-6) 
Defendant argues that in September of 1958 the di-
rectors of Plaintiff company authorized him to defer pay-
ment for the soil removed to the stockpile until such time 
as it was actually sold by the Defendant. Plaintiff contends 
that no such agreement was ever made on behalf of Plain-
tiff, and that, in any event, no one ever contemplated that 
the soil would not be sold within a reasonable period of 
time. 
Mr. L. L. Cook, a director of Plaintiff company, who 
was present at the meeting where such permission was 
allegedly given, testified that it was agreed that Defen-
dant would pay for the soil as he removed it from the 
mountain, as he had always done in the past. (R-105, 109, 
114, Cook's Deposition page 34). 
In April of 1963 the Defendant, together with two 
directors of Plaintiff company, who were also present at 
the 1958 meeting, met and terminated the agreement be-





.. was in default by reason of the fact that said 
W. H. Hopkinson had removed some 1,600 tons 
and had stored the same at the home of his sister 
in Salt Lake and had never paid for the earth re-
moved. (Exhibit E, Defendant's Deposition). 
In September of 1963 the defendant and his attorney 
met with Plaintiff's board of directors and proposed that 
Defendant pay for the soil for which a demand had been 
made. The following August the Plaintiff's corporate sec-
retary made a further and final demand upon Defendant 
for payment for the soil which he had removed and not 
paid for. 
Every witness at the trial, including the Defendant, 
testified that it was contemplated that all of the soil in the 
stockpile would be sold during the Winter of 1958, or at 
least within a reasonable time thereafter. ( R-84, 95, 104, 
Defendant's Deposition pages 16, 17, 52). No one dreamed 
that 11 years later Defendant would still have the soil in 
his stockpile, would still refuse to pay for it, and would 
even refuse to make any efforts to sell the soil. 
The facts do not reflect, as held by the Trial Court, 
that it was the practice over the years for Defendant to 
pay for the soil as it was sold. In 1952, and again in 1955 
when Defendant removed soil for experimentation, Defen-
dant immediately paid for the soil as it was removed. 
(Defendant's Deposition pages 35, 36). Again in 1963 the 
Defendant removed approximately 260 tons of soil and 
immediately paid for it. (Defendant's Deposition pages 
36, 42). The only soil which has been removed by the De-
fendant and not immediately paid for, is the soil which 
is the subject matter of this lawsuit. The evidence would 
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seem to indicate, contrary to the holding of the Trial 
Court, that it was the practice ove the years for Defen-
dant to pay for the soil as it was removed, not as it was 
sold. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant was given per-
mission to defer payment until this particular amount of 
soil was sold, what court would deny Plaintiff the right to 
force Defendant, after total lapse of 11 years and inaction 
by Defendant, to remit full payment for the soil? Defen-
dant has had total custody of the soil and his inaction has 
worked a hardship upon Plaintiff. What may well have 
been a reasonable arrangement at the time it was pur-
portedly made, has by Defendant's inaction and unreason-
able delays become an unconscionable agreement. This 
Court can remedy the inequity only by requiring Defen-
dant to pay for the soil he has had for 11 years. 
Cross-Appellant prays that this court declare that the 
"reasonable time" to complete the sale, as contemplated 
by the parties to such alleged agreement, expired in 1964, 
when Plaintiff made the final and formal demand upon 
Defendant, and that the agreed upon price became due 
and payable notwithstanding Defendant's neglect to ac-
tually sell the soil. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD . 
THAT ANY CLAIM PLAINTIFF MIGHT HAVE 
WOULD BE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIM-
ITATIONS. 
Appellant argues, and the Trial Court has held, that 
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Defendant is not obligated to pay for the top soil until 
such time as it is actually sold. In addition the Trial Court 
held that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statue of limita-
tions. 
Rule 9 ( h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in part as follows: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is not neces-
sary to state the facts showing the defense but it 
may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing by section number, sub-
section designation, if any, or otherwise designating 
the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to 
identify it. 
In Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Co. et al., 78 Utah 
158, 2 P 2d 107, 111, (1931) the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "the defense of the statute of limitations is not 
available unless pleaded." In the case of Spanish Fork City 
vs. Hopper, 7 Utah 235, 26 Pac. 293, 294, (1891), where-
in Defendant's Answer merely stated that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that no issue as to the statute of limitations 
was raised because Defendant failed to plead the section 
of the code relied upon. 
Both Defendant's Answer (R-7) and his untimely 
Amendment to the Answer (R-23) fail to properly plead 
the statute of limitations due to his failure to specify which 
of the many statutes of limitations he is relying on. The 
trial court erred in ruling on Defendant's improperly plead 
affirmative defense based on some unspecified statute of 
18 
limitations, and Appellant cannot now raise or rely upon 
the statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, it is Defendant's burden, due to his 
affirmative defense, to produce facts at the trial which 
would support the allegation that Plaintiff's claim is 
barred. (See Kimball vs. M cCornick, 70 Utah 198, 259 ' 
Pac. 313, 31 7, ( 1927).). Defendant Hopkinson failed to 
produce any evidence in response to this burden. In fact, 
no mention of the statute of limitations was made by the 
Defendant subsequent to the "faulty" pleading. 
Assuming Defendant had properly plead the statute 
of limitations, what particular statute is he relying on? 
Appellant's whole argument is that his rights are founded 
upon a series of written documents, which he asserts are · 
still in effect. Appellant further contends that all of the . 
soil was taken under the same general arrangement. The 
applicable statute of limitations over the type of transac-
tion claimed by the Defendant is Section 78-12-23 ( 2), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which specifies a 6 year 
period. The evidence presented supports Plaintiff's con-
tention that the agreement terminated in 1963. This ac-
tion was commenced well within the 6 year period follow-
ing termination of the written agreement. 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S CONCLUSION 
This action was commenced as a simple action to , 
collect the value of soil removed from Plaintiff's land by 
the Defendant, acting pursuant to an earlier permission to 
remove soil. The quantity of soil involved, 1,300 tons, 
and the value of the soil, $4.80 per ton, is not in dispute. 




giving him a long term property right in the property from 
which the soil was removed. Defendant further claims 
astronomical damages by reason of Plaintiff's denial of 
his alleged property right. Tacked on to this absurd and 
completely unsupported set of charges is a claim by De-
fendant that, on the basis of some oral promise made in 
1958, he is not yet obligated to pay for the soil. 
The Trial Court patiently heard every shred of evi-
dence bearing on this matter and ruled that the terms of 
the agreement were so speculaive as to be unenforceable 
and that Defendant's claim for damages could not be sup-
ported by the evidence. The Trial Court further held, con-
trary to the evidence, that Defendant is not obligated to 
pay for the soil until it had been sold by the Defendant, 
that he is not yet obligated, and further, that when it 
becomes due, Plaintiff's claim would be barred by the 
statute of limitations. This latter part of the court's ruling 
is inconsistent with both law and reason, and will not 
stand up on review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Richard R. Neslen 
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr. 
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